DUI Manslaughter & Causation
Interesting trial from a few years back. Had a client charged with Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While Intoxicated in violation of Penal Code section 191.5. I believe that’s the right code section - maybe 192? Case was filed after client fatally this fellow who was standing in the highway at 2am. Client’s BA estimated around .08 about 45 minutes after the collision. Not great numbers to work with. Probably a more delicate way to put it given the whole mise en scene. Fellow who was struck was himself intoxicated by alcohol and opiates - I believe heroin. I mention his intoxication only because it was relevant to disputed issues in the case. Drugs and alcohol impair judgment, lower inhibitions, effect balance and coordination and delay reaction time. Evidence of his intoxication tends to corroborate what witnesses said about the victim’s positioning immediately prior to impact. There were some inconsistencies in witness reports but at least one of them said that the victim had sort of sprung or stumbled out into the road immediately prior to getting hit.
There was also some dispute at trial over the speed my client’s car was moving. It was probably between 35-45 mph. We had a traffic engineer perform a speed survey at the location which involved collecting data from passing vehicles over a period of like, 3-4 days. Would need to look at the numbers again but I think we were able to determine that out of our sample of a thousand or so drivers, ~60% of them were travelling 35-45 mph. Of course, this was relevant to whether or not my client acted with gross negligence - DA theory in this case was that speeding was the grossly negligent act. Well if a majority of people are doing the exact same thing can it really be grossly negligent when my client does it? Probably not. With questions of negligence aren’t you supposed to look at whether or not the defendant deviated from the standard of care that would be exercised by ordinary folks under the same or similar circumstances? Here’s part of the jury instruction defining gross negligence:
A person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act.
Enough about gross negligence. This post is isn’t about that. It’s about breaks in the chain of causation. As I recall, DUI manslaughter with gross negligence requires a grossly negligent act which proximately causes the death of the victim (the jury instruction might use the “natural and probable cause” language.) What’s important is that driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated in not enough by itself to prove that the person acted with gross negligence. There are also these things called superseding intervening acts which can relieve a defendant of some criminal liability. Keep in mind I haven’t looked closely at these cases in a few years. The law may have changed since this trial. Here’s what I found in the motions that we filed:
In general, an 'independent' intervening cause will absolve a defendant of criminal liability. (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) § 131, p. 149.) However, in order to be 'independent' the intervening cause must be 'unforeseeable . . . an extraordinary and abnormal occurrence, which rises to the level of an exonerating, superseding cause.' ( People v. Armitage (1987) 194 Cal. App. 3d 405, 420-421.)
On the other hand, a 'dependent' intervening cause will not relieve the defendant of criminal liability. 'A defendant may be criminally liable for a result directly caused by his act even if there is another contributing cause. If an intervening cause is a normal and reasonably foreseeable result of defendant's original act the intervening act is "dependent" and not a superseding cause, and will not relieve defendant of liability. [Citation.] "[] The consequence need not have been a strong probability; a possible consequence which might reasonably have been contemplated is enough. [] The precise consequence need not have been foreseen; it is enough that the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of some harm of the kind which might result from his act." [Citation.]' ( People v. Harris (1975) 52 Cal. App. 3d 419, 427.)" ( People v. Funes (1994) 23 Cal. App. 4th 1506, 1523; see also People v. Hansen (1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th 473, 479; People v. Schmies (1996) 44 Cal. App. 4th 38, 49; People v. Hebert (1964) 228 Cal. App. 2d 514, 520.)
So I argued that the fellow standing in the highway was an intervening and superseding cause that was unforeseeable and that it relieved my client of criminal liability at least as it related to the death of the young fellow. I was surprised by the verdict: client found not guilty of gross negligence DUI manslaughter but guilty of ordinary negligence DUI manslaughter. She was also charged with DUI causing great bodily injury, which was a strike offense and carried a much higher potential punishment than ordinary negligence DUI manslaughter. I believe the court either stayed the punishment or dismissed those counts. Something called the Williamson rule says that if there is a general statute and a more specific statute and that the more specific statute can’t be committed without necessarily committing the more general statute then a defendant must be prosecuted under the specific statute only. Something like that?? I’m sure I didn’t get that right…
Sad case I thought and nobody really won.
